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Abstract
Financial crises are high cost events which can transmit across in-
ternational borders. Using data from 1883 to 2008 this paper develops
a means of mapping changes in the degree of international synchroni-
sation of banking and currency crises through a formal concordance
index. This index specifically accounts for the typically low incidence
and potential serial correlation of crisis data. The results show that
banking crises were highly internationalised at the beginning of the
20th century, and became far less so in the strong regulatory environ-
ment prevailing after the Depression until the 1980s. A strong increase
in the synchronicity of international banking crises is revealed during
the late 20th and early 21st century. Currency crises began the century
as more idioysncratic, but have tended to become more synchronised
over the 115 year sample.
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1 Introduction
As is glaringly apparent from the crisis events of 2007-2008, financial crises
can have a huge impact on economies. Fortunately they do not occur very
often. Partly motivated by policy interest in mitigating their economic costs
there is a relatively large literature focussed on whether crises are becoming
more linked across geographic borders. Some of the channels proposed in-
clude trade links, Glick and Rose (1999), banking linkages, Van Rijckeghem
and Weder (2001), more recently via credit derivatives, Brunnermeier (2009)
and lacking common fundamental and institutional features, via contagion
effects, Rose and Spiegel (2009). Important debates concern how to limit
the spread of crises, particularly through various agenda on reforming global
financial architecture, see for example Eichengreen (2002) following the East
Asian crisis and Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persuad and Shin (2009)
on the recent credit crunch and even Bagehot (1873).
Evidence suggests that the prevalence of financial crises has been in-
creasing, particularly since World War II; Eichengreen and Bordo (2003),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) Glick and Hutchison (2001), and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2009). However, measures of changes in the extent of internation-
alisation of crises are more scarce. It is of particular interest to understand
whether more prevalent crises are internationally linked or are idiosyncratic
and simply occur coincidentally.
The contribution of this paper is in developing a means of mapping
changes in the degree of international synchronisation of financial crises from
the late 19th century through to 2008 through a formal concordance index.
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To examine the history of crises we use a sample of 21 countries’ annual bank-
ing and currency crisis data for 1883 to 1998 drawn from Bordo et al. (2001),
updated with the recent dataset of Laeven and Valencia (2008) to 2007 to
which we add observations for 2008. In common with most crisis data, the
sample consists of bivariate indices taking the value 1 in the presence of a
crisis. Our concordance index uses this data to construct a measure ranging
from 0 to 1 to characterise the extent of international interdependence in
financial crises. A value of 1 indicates that all crises are simultaneous. The
advantage of the concordance indices compared to the traditional correlation
measure is the ability to investigate synchronisation among more than two
crises and to formally test for independence. These tests take into account
the binary nature of the data, the relatively low incidence of crises, and po-
tential serial correlation. When applied to the sample data they reveal that
the occurrence of 5 (4) or more contemporaneous currency (banking) crises
in the data is not likely to be coincidental.
The evolution of the concordance indices indicates that currency crises
have not only become more prevalent but also more internationally synchro-
nised over the twentieth century. Banking crises were highly internationalised
at the beginning of the 20th century, but became far less so during the strong
regulatory environment prevailing after the Depression until the 1980s. How-
ever, the incidence of banking crises has grown in the past 30 years, and the
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 sees a jump in the synchronisation of these
crises. Greater frequency of currency crises and lower frequency of banking
crises are associated with capital controls by Glick and Hutchison (2001) and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Coupling their results with the concordance
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indices reveals that more liberalized financial conditions are associated with
a greater prevalence of banking crises at the end of the sample and increasing
internationalisation of currency crises. Although there are limited incidences
of joint banking and currency crises (twin crises) in the data set, some anal-
ysis of their transmission is warranted in the light of their much higher cost
for economies involved, see for example Stiglitz (1999).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the histori-
cal background of banking and currency crises in the 20th century. Section
3 is methodological, presenting definitions of synchronisation, and bivariate
and multivariate concordance indices and means of testing for independence
between crises with these indices. Section 4 provides the results of apply-
ing these techniques to the sample data and extracts a number of testable
propositions from the literature. Section 5 concludes.
2 Banking and Currency Crises in the 20th
Century
There is a substantial literature on various episodes of crisis from the late 19th
century to the close of the 20th century. See for example Kindleberger (1996),
Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Bordo et al. (2001), Bordo (2003), Eichengreen
(2003), Isard (2005, Chapter 2), or Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). The exact
chronology of the period is not uniformly agreed, as rules for dating crises are
notoriously imprecise. However, there is broad agreement about a number
of periods.
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Chronologically the first period runs from the late 1800s to the beginning
of World War I associated with the period of the gold standard. Two major
crises from this period were the Barings scandal resulting from over invest-
ment in Latin America, and the banking panic in the US and other countries
in 1907 and 1908. This period is covered in some detail in the Appendix to
Bordo and Eichengreen (1999).
The interwar period can be divided into two. The first covers the decade
from 1919 to 1929, characterised by the attempts to return the international
financial system to the gold standard and the consequent strains placed on
economies in aligning their internal and external positions, as discussed by
Isard (2005). The period from 1929 to the advent of World War II includes
the Depression and the greatest concentration of both banking and currency
crises in developed nations as the gold standard was broken, resulting in
what Isard (2005) calls an ‘uncoordinated hybrid system’. The period of the
second World War was one of tight controls and produces no crisis data.
Post World War II, the next 25 years are characterised by the exchange
rate arrangements of Bretton-Woods. During the Bretton-Woods era cur-
rency crises were prevalent, and as Bordo and Schwartz (1996) discuss, of-
ten traumatic due to the need to align the internal economy with previously
agreed rates and political difficulties in making changes to the exchange rates.
Following the breakdown of Bretton-Woods in 1971 an increasing number of
countries adopt a floating exchange rate. The 1990s in particular seems to
have been characterised by plentiful financial crises, including the East Asian
crisis, comprising both currency and banking crises across a variety of coun-
tries. The high incidence of crises in these years is noted by both Crockett
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(2004) and Haldane and Kruger (2004).
Finally, 2007-2008 represents the period of greatest financial turmoil since
the crises associated with the Great Depression. The source of the crisis is
widely regarded to be the collapse of the securitised market for sub-prime
mortgages in the US, which in itself was riding the back of a housing price
bubble likely exacerbated by relatively loose monetary policy. Financial inno-
vation and a tendency to self-regulation in new financial products contributed
to the creation of a set interlinkages based on credit derivatives and regula-
tory arbitrage which seriously threatened the most developed markets and
their economies. Descriptions of this crisis can be found in Rose and Spiegel
(2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009).
To investigate the measurement of synchronisation of crises we use the
long run annual data set of Bordo et al. (2001) for currency and banking
crises for 21 countries over the period 1883 to 1998, and update this to 2007
with the crisis data provided in Laeven and Valencia (2008). Finally, we
augment this with data for 2008, based on the details of the programs imple-
mented in each of the 21 countries in response to the 2007-2008 crisis as laid
out by the IMF (2009a). In Bordo et al. currency crises occur in association
with either a forced change in parity, a realignment or as indicated by an
exchange market pressure index exceeding a threshold value.1 In Laeven and
Valencia (2008) currency crises are indicated by a currency depreciation of
at least 30%, where this is at least 10% greater than the rate of deprecia-
tion in the previous year. This did not occur for any of the currencies in
1The exchange market pressure index is constructed as a weighted sum of exchange
rates, interest rate differentials and changes in reserves as per Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1995,1996).
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the sample in 2008. Banking crises in Bordo et al. are dated as periods of
continuous financial distress leading to substantial erosion of banking cap-
ital, as per Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). Laeven and Valencia (2008) use
a combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators, including the pres-
ence of bank runs, bank guarantees or substantial injections of liquidity or
capital. The selection of a country as having experienced a banking crisis in
2008 was based upon the criteria of whether the IMF (2009a) (i) reported
a loan guarantee program (ii) nationalisation of financial institutions (iii)
significant injections of capital into banks. This was augmented by material
from individual central banks and country sources.2
The data set takes the form of annual binary indices, taking a 1 in years
when a crisis occurs, and a 0 otherwise. The countries included are Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Table 1 shows the occurrences of the
crises in the dataset.3 The Table clearly shows the greater prevalence of cur-
rency than banking crises; only in the US, Italy and Belgium have there been
more banking crises than currency crises for a particular country. The Table
also indicates the incidence of joint occurrence of contemporaneous banking
and currency crises in a single country, labelled twin crises. Compared with
the occurrence of single crisis types, twin crises are uncommon, a feature also
apparent in the data sets of Glick and Hutchison (2001) and Kaminsky and
2The countries denoted as experiencing a banking crisis are: Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
3Obviously, alternative crisis dating rules would result in somewhat different crises




Figures 1 and 2 give the time distribution of each of the currency and
banking crises. What is immediately apparent is the relative infrequency of
these events; there are many more non-crisis years than crisis years. Partic-
ular years stand out. In 1907 a banking crisis occurred in seven of the 21
countries in the sample—see Goodhart and Delargy (1998). Both banking
and currency crises were widespread in 1931 associated with the Great De-
pression, with eight countries experiencing both banking and currency crises
(twin crises), a further five countries experienced a banking crisis alone, and
a further six countries a currency crisis alone.
The next major period of disruption in the sample is the currency crises
associated with the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971 when 12 countries
observed currency crises (but not banking crises). The third major set of
currency crises in the dataset occurs in the 1992 ERM crisis, when the UK
and Italy exited the system, and seven of the European countries report a
crisis observation (Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
and the UK). Banking crises in this data set do not meet with pre-World
War II levels again. The 1997-1998 period of the East Asian currency crisis
does not stand out in this dataset as this crisis did not heavily impact the
countries included in the dataset.
Finally in 2008 there is a cluster of banking crises across 10 of the countries
in the sample. This is the second highest occurrence of simultaneous crises
in the sample after the year 1931 where there were 13 countries in banking
crisis. It surpasses the 1907 crisis at the beginning of the sample.
Increasing incidence of currency crises has been associated with periods
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of war by Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and Bordo and Eichengreen (1999).
Considering the Wars that occur in the 20th century as the Boer War (1899-
1902), World War I (1914-1918), World War II (1939-1945), the Korean War
(1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1962-1973) and the Gulf Wars (1991, 2003-
2008) we see that the two wars where the hypothesis of increasing currency
crisis sychronisation is evidently upheld here are the Korean and Vietnam
Wars. In the 1930s there was an increase in currency crisis synchronisation,
and to the (large) extent that the poor inter-war economic conditions con-
tributed to World War II, this also supports the association between war and
currency crises.
The dataset provides prima facie evidence that clusters of crises occur
together. In order to establish a measure of the degree of synchronisation
between banking crises and currency crises the following section develops a
concordance index. The index accounts for the particular characteristics of
the data—binary, low incidence, potentially serially correlated data with a
largely unobserved underlying data generating process. We use it to both
formally test the extent to which observed contemporaneous crises may be
independent and to analyse the history of financial crises in Section 4.
3 Methodology
3.1 Synchronisation
We consider P countries and Q markets. Let a financial crisis be represented
by the binary variable Si,t, where i = 1, . . . , PQ, t = 1, . . . , n. Si,t takes
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the value one if a crisis occurs in the corresponding country and market in
period t and zero otherwise. The mean of the series Si,t, t = 1, . . . , n is
denoted µSi . If two series are identical, that is Sx,t = Sy,t for all t, the series
are perfectly synchronised and have equal means and perfect positive cor-
relation. When series exhibit strong synchronisation, the means of the two
series and the correlation between them describe how synchronised the series
are, omitting the uninteresting cases where the series are either continually
in crisis, or continually not (Sx,t = 1 or Sy,t = 0 for all t). For the remain-
der of this paper the means of the financial crises series and the number
of observations are assumed known.4 Binary financial crises series typically
have low incidence, are ordered in time, stochastically dependent and pos-
sibly serially correlated. A standard way of defining synchronisation is by
means of correlation coefficients. However, there is no one-to-one relation
between correlation coefficients and synchronisation. It is quite possible to
observe series with equal means but different correlation coefficients, or sets
of series with equal correlation coefficients but different means. In this case
the synchronisation between the series will differ.
An alternative way to define synchronisation is from contingency tables
which ‘count’ the number of times the variables Sx,t and Sy,t are in various
combinations of states.5 Consider the following (2× 2) contingency table.
4The binary financial crisis dummy series are constructed from an underlying data
generating process by clipping or hard limiting (Benjamin Kedem 1980) although there
need not exist a clear link to the data generating process. We deviate from Pagan (2005)
in this respect.
5For an introduction to contingency tables see Agresti (2002, Chapter 2).
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Bivariate crises: (2× 2) contingency table
Crisis Sy No crisis Sy Row sums
Crisis Sx n11 n12 n1.
No crisis Sx n21 n22 n2.
Column sums n.1 n.2 n
In the contingency table n11 denotes the number of simultaneous crises that
is when Sx,t = Sy,t = 1, n12 the number of periods with a crisis of a type
x only, n21 the number of periods with a single crisis of type y, and n22
is the number of tranquil periods. The row and column sums are fixed, as
well as the number of observations n. Therefore only one of the nij can
vary independently. Without loss of generality we take this to be n11. As
we will show next, the contingency table approach provides a useful means
of developing bivariate, and later multivariate, indices of the contemporary
concordance between financial crises.
3.2 Bivariate concordance indices
Concordance indices can be simply constructed from a 2×2 contingency table
like that shown in Section 3 by ‘counting’ the number of times the variables
Sx,t and Sy,t are in various combinations of states. In a bivariate setting the
total observations in the sample (n) consist of the number of simultaneous
crises periods (n11), the number of periods with a single crisis (n12 +n21) and
the number of tranquil periods (n22), or n ≡ n11 + n12 + n21 + n22.
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Harding and Pagan (2006) advocate measuring the degree of synchroni-
sation in business cycles in terms of the fraction of time the cycles are in the





A typical feature of financial crises is their low incidence, or a large number
of tranquil periods in the sample. It seems natural then to confine attention




n− n22 , (2)
where we assume that there is at least one crisis in the sample, i.e., n22 6= n.
Equation (2) gives the number of times in which the two markets are both
in crisis as a proportion of the number of times there are any crises in the
sample. The construction of the denominator removes the influence of the
dominant proportion of non-crisis periods (all zeros) which would prevail if
the Harding and Pagan indicator of Equation (1) was applied.6 Hence, the
influence of the dominant non-crisis periods is removed.
Equation (2) can be expressed in terms of means and correlation coeffi-
cients as
Iˆ =
ρˆs(µˆSx(1− µˆSx))1/2(µˆSy(1− µˆSy))1/2 + µˆSxµˆSy
− (ρˆs(µˆSx(1− µˆSx))1/2(µˆSy(1− µˆSy))1/2 + µˆSxµˆSy) + µˆSx + µˆSy , (3)
where ρˆs represents the sample correlation coefficient between the two crisis
6The bivariate signal extraction measure used in Glick and Hutchison (2001) also makes
the modification of removing non-crisis periods from the denominator.
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indices Sx,t and Sy,t. This function is plotted in Figure 3 for the example of
equivalent means in the two series. Figure 3 shows that high concordance is
achieved when correlation is high, ρˆs = 1 or means are high µˆx = µˆy = 1, or a
combination of these two characteristics. As either of ρˆs or µˆx = µˆy approach
one, the value of the concordance index increases. This makes sense because
as the number of crisis observations in the sample increases the possibility of
overlap also increases, even in the extreme case of independence of crises (a
topic to which we return below).
3.3 Multivariate concordance indices
Consider the more interesting case of concordance in the context of multiple
financial crises across countries for any particular market. Clearly synchro-
nisation cannot be expressed in correlation coefficients any more, unless we
consider all bivariate combinations appropriate. However the contingency
table framework can be extended from (2× 2) to (r × c).
Any instances of concordance across the indices for a particular market
may be of interest, focussing attention on the joint occurrence of two or more
crises. Denoting Z as the minimum number of crises to occur concurrently
we can work out the frequency of observing Z crises in n periods as fZ = n
multichoose Z = n!
(n−Z)!Z! . So the frequency of observing Z or more crises in
n periods must be the sum of fz for all z ≥ Z.
The total number of periods n is divided into periods involving multiple
crises, denoted nz, which can be further separated into nz≥Z where there are
Z or more crises contemporaneously and n1≤z<Z , where there are less than
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Z crises but at least one, and the number of periods involving no crises in
any country, denoted nz=0, so that n ≡ nz≥Z + n1≤z<Z + nz=0. Then the
multivariate version of our concordance index is expressed as
IˆM =
nz≥Z
n− nz=0 . (4)
Movements in this index are easily interpreted. An increase in the value of the
index simply indicates that further episodes of concurrent financial crises have
occurred (both the numerator and denominator have increased, recalling that
we have omitted the uninteresting case of perfect synchronisation to ensure
that the index is not equal to one). In the case of no change in the index,
there have been no periods of turmoil and neither numerator or denominator
of the index change. Declines in the index indicate the occurrence of isolated
crises so that the denominator increases without an accompanying change
in the numerator. This trade-off is illustrated in Figure 4 which shows the
multivariate version of the index for Z = 2, with equal means for all series.
Before turning to the applications of the concordance indices we consider
tests for independence between series based on the concordance indices.
3.4 Testing synchronisation
To test whether synchronisation is not coincidental involves testing for inde-
pendence. In the case of bivariate combinations of crises this could be done
by a correlation coefficient test, tests in the contingency table framework of
Section 3.1 or by simulation. And each of these has analogues for the multi-
variate case. One complication is the potential serial correlation of the binary
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crises data. In other applications with constructed binary indices from ob-
served data generating processes, a test for correlation takes the possibility
of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity into account as in Harding and
Pagan (2006). Here we apply tests based on the contingency table frame-
work and simulation methods. We explicitly make use of the low incidence
of financial crises and the resulting discrete distributions which enable the
design of exact tests. We pretest each binary crisis series for serial correlation
with a Fisher exact test using the null of independence against a higher-order
Markov chain.7 A rejection of the null indicates serial correlation, although
does not uniquely establish its Markov chain order.
At least one of the countries exhibits serial correlation in each of the
banking and currency crisis series. For this reason we test bivariate and
multivariate synchronisation using simulation techniques. We simulate the
series S˜x to have the same properties as Sx. Under the null hypothesis that
the observed number of crises are randomly drawn from a uniform (0,1)
distribution, the number of observed crises in the data set gives the exact
number of draws to simulate, that is in each case the µx = µ˜x where the latter
term is the mean of the simulated series. In cases where Sx rejects the null of
independence, i.e. is serially correlated, the simulated data uses the observed
runs of contiguous crises in the original data in simulating to retain the serial
correlation properties in the simulated data. We use 10,000 replications to
generate the critical values. Converting these critical values for the totals
into critical values for the bivariate and multivariate concordance indices is
7For a description of Fisher’s exact test for 2× 2 tables see Agresti (2002), Section 3.5.
For statistical inference with Markov chains see e.g. Anderson and Goodman (1957).
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straightforward from Equations (2) and (4).
4 Empirical Application
Table 2 shows the results of pretesting independence against a first order
Markov process on the transition matrices as described in the previous sec-
tion for currency and banking crises in each of the 21 countries. As is quickly
observed, almost all series display independence. The exceptions are Den-
mark and the UK for currency crises, and France, Norway and the US for
banking crises.
4.1 Bivariate concordance
Table 3 shows bivariate turbulent-period concordance indices for currency
crises with corresponding 95% critical values in the upper and lower trian-
gles of the table respectively. The critical values are obtained by simulation
as described in the previous section. The country pairs for which currency
crises reject the null of independence predominantly involve crises where two
European countries are involved. For example, the results for Finland show
that nine of the rejections of independence involve other European countries
(Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the UK)
and three non-European pairs with Argentina, Australia and Canada. The
Netherlands, Norway and Poland show similar patterns. Argentina is also
frequently one of the pair considered in bivariate tests which reject indepen-
dence, including with all other Latin American countries. These results lend
further credence to the concern over regional interdependence in financial
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crises; for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (2003), Glick and Rose (1999),
Dungey and Martin (2007), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 257-259).
Table 4 lists bivariate turbulent period concordance indices and corre-
sponding 95% critical values derived from simulation for banking crises. Se-
rial correlation has been taken into account for France, Norway and the US.
There are a substantial number of incidences of rejections of independence
between the bivariate banking crises. The greatest number of rejections as
part of a pair occur for the US, likely reflecting its status as a world financial
centre during much of the sample period. Italy, Belgium and Poland have
the next greatest number of rejections, rejecting independence in bivariate
crisis observations with most European countries as well as the US. Inter-
estingly, the UK only rejects independence in bivariate pairs of crisis with
the US, while Japan and Canada find no incidences in which independence
is rejected.
Given the relationships revealed by the bivariate indices we now consider
the testing of multivariate concordance.
4.2 Multivariate concordance
Table 5 reports the multivariate concordance indices for the group of crises
which across countries over the entire sample. Each row reports the concor-
dance index for the stated number of common crises occurring across these
categories shown in the first column. So the first row reports the concordance
index for at least two concurrent currency crises across the 21 economies sam-
pled. A total of 39 time periods are identified which fulfill that criteria, giving
16
a turbulent periods index of 0.57.
The final column of Table 5 reports the 95% critical value for the concor-
dance indices in each case expressed as the maximum number of times that
one would observe that many crises and be able to reject the null of indepen-
dence. That is for the row of at least two simultaneous currency crises, one
can observe up to 18 occurrences of two simultaneous crises without having
to reject independence. In the sample there are 39 occurrences of at least two
simultaneous currency crises, clearly rejecting independence. In the case of
banking crises, the row labelled at least two crises contains 26 observations
with a turbulent periods index value of 0.59 for the sample. One can observe
up to seven cases of two simultaneous crises whilst being consistent with in-
dependence, which is clearly rejected by the 26 cases observed in the dataset.
The results in Table 5 show that the sample rejects independence between
simultaneous crises in all instances. The Table shows that a single occur-
rence of five simultaneous currency crises (four simultaneous banking crises)
is sufficient to reject independence in the data. This implies there is some
underlying mechanism connecting the observed occurrence of simultaneous
crises.
Policy makers are correct to be concerned about the occurrence of a cri-
sis. However, knowing which crises are going to spread is as yet unresolved.
Isolating the characteristics of what makes a particular crisis spread, or al-
ternatively what makes other markets vulnerable to spread from other crises
remains an important issue, and is the focus of work on indicators of financial
fragility such as associated with Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
Unfortunately this literature has not been particularly successful to date,
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with the relatively poor performance of these indicators documented in Berg
and Patillo (1999). Further, the cross-section analysis of Rose and Spiegel
(2009) suggests little commonality in macroeconomic and institutional set-
tings across countries affected by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The
problem lies with the heterogeneity of the crises; it seems no two crises are
ever the same. However, it is important we do know that crisis situations will
tend to exacerbate other weaknesses in the economy and financial system, in-
creasing the possibility of crises in other markets and countries, which is the
aspect we see reflected in the concordance indices and their critical values.
4.3 Twin crises
Before proceeding to the analysis of the internationalisation of banking and
currency crises over time we first examine the evidence on twin crises; that
is where a banking and currency crisis occur simultaneously. Twin crises are
well known to be more costly than individual crises. Bordo et al. (2001)
calculate the output loss of twin crises as twice as costly as currency crises
and four times more costly than banking crises, see also Stiglitz (1999), and
Kaminksy and Reinhart (1999). The lack of occurrences of twin crises in the
dataset prohibits the construction of an informative concordance index.8
8Both Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Glick and Hutchison (2001) avoid the prob-
lem of low incidence of contemporaneous crises by defining a window in which crises may
occur and still be considered twin. We have constructed a similar index of twin crises to
Glick and Hutchison, which increases the number of incidences in our sample from 21 (of
which 3 are post World War II) to almost 50 (with 13 post World War II), however the
method induces serial correlation into the index data which further complicates statistical
analysis. Neither Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) nor Glick and Hutchison (2001) deal
with this complication.
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Table 6 illustrates the joint occurrence of contemporaneous currency and
banking crises. The columns give the number of occurrences of either no,
one or multiple contemporaneous banking crises, while the rows give the
same information for currency crises. As already seen the most populous
combination is a non-crisis period (the top left cell), with 46 of the 126
sample observations. The presence of both multiple banking and currency
crises only numbers 13, of which twin crises (restricted to occur in the same
country) are a subsample. It is worth noting that the number of periods with
no currency crises but one or more banking crises is very small at seven (of a
total of 39 banking crises in the sample) while the number of periods with no
banking crises but one or more currency crises is 36, or 52 percent of the 69
periods containing currency crises. It seems that the occurrence of banking
crises in isolation from currency crises somewhere in the world is much less
likely than the occurrence of currency crises in isolation from banking crises
somewhere in the world. In this respect the events of 2007-2008 have been
unusual in being dominated by banking crises.
4.4 Historical analysis
Figure 5 shows recursive calculations of the multivariate concordance indices
for banking and currency crises using the initial 20 observations of the dataset
as the starting point and increasing the sample size by one observation at the
time. Increases in the concordance index indicate an increase in international
financial turmoil. A stable concordance index is associated with a period of
tranquility. A decrease in the concordance index is equally informative, as it
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signals an increase in isolated financial turmoil, that is turmoil confined to
single (or small groups of countries if Z > 2). Figure 5 shows the recursive
concordance index for the case of two or more simultaneous crises, so that a
decline in this index is associated with the occurrence of isolated single crises.
Similar indices can be constructed for higher numbers of simultaneous crises,
but the results are consistent with the analysis presented here.
We observe a constant value of the currency concordance index from 1908
to 1920, indicating periods of tranquility during the gold standard for cur-
rencies. As discussed in the historical overview of Section 2, the 1920s is
characterised by periods of currency crises. There are instances of both in-
creased international turmoil (increases in the index) and of isolated turmoil
(decreases in the index). The most pronounced feature of the figure is the
large increase in the currency crisis concordance index in the early 1930s,
associated with several years of contemporaneous crises, 14 in 1931 and 6 in
1932 as shown in Figure 1. This is followed by a few isolated crises in the
mid 1930s and then the stability associated with controls during World War
II. The Bretton-Woods era divides clearly into two components, the general
movement in the index to the mid 1960s is downwards, reflecting isolated
currency crises. From 1963 onwards the index begins to increase, indicat-
ing increasing internationalisation of crises, reflecting the building pressure
towards the end of Bretton-Woods in 1971. The index climbs in the 1970s
before a brief hiatus after the second oil price shock. From 1992 and the
ERM crisis, however, the general impression is again of increasing interna-
tionalisation of currency crises.
The banking concordance index begins at a higher level than the cur-
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rency crisis index, referring to the greater degree of disruption in the late
19th century in banking than in currency markets. For the period up to
World War II the pattern is not dissimilar to that of the currency crises.
The index falls in the 1920s reflecting isolated turmoil, and then rises in
1931 and 1932 reflecting the Depression period. A very long stable period
in the banking crisis concordance index prevails during the post World War
II period until 1963, when there is a banking crisis in Brazil. Stability again
ensues until 1976. The scattering of isolated banking crises shown in Fig-
ure 2 then results in further falls in the index. The index then decreases up
to 1986, followed by a period of increase to 1991 associated with increased
international turmoil. Thereafter the index is relatively stable until the re-
cent period where it has recently kicked up again to levels last seen in the
1991. Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2006) hypothesise that increased
concentration in the banking sector is associated with fewer crises on data
for 1980-1997. This may be borne out in the most recent crisis where some of
the most concentrated banking sectors in the world, such as Australia, have
been relatively unaffected.
The tests of multivariate synchronisation provided in the previous section
mean that it is possible to identify particular points in time which contribute
statistically significant information to the analysis. These are when there
are 5 (4) or more contemporaneous currency (banking) crises. In terms of
currency crises this occurs in 1921, 1931, 1932, 1949, 1971, 1976, and 1992.
Each of these periods are well known stress points in historical analysis. In
banking crises 4 or more crises are observed in 1907, 1921, 1923, 1931, 1932
and then a very long hiatus in internationally synchronised banking crises
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until 2008.
An interesting aspect of Figure 5 is that the historical pattern differs
across the two indices.9 In general there have been more periods of inter-
national financial turmoil in currency crises, leading to an increase in the
index over the 20th century, while banking crises have tended to be more
internationally linked at the beginning of the century than the end. Banking
crises have tended to have relatively more independent occurrences following
the Great Depression until the last decade of the 20th century. There is a
disturbing uptick in the internationalisation of banking crises in the late 20th
and early 21st centuries.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed a multivariate turmoil-periods concordance index for
financial crises in order to provide a measure of the degree of internation-
alisation of banking and currency crises. The index is readily interpretable
over time and accounts for the typical properties of crisis data: that is binary,
low incidence, potentially serially correlated crisis events. The index can be
used to assess the independence of observed events, using simply constructed
critical values. Moves in the multivariate turmoil-periods concordance index
indicate the changing pattern of financial turmoil in world financial markets
for the period 1883-2008. The index is stable during periods without finan-
cial crises, declines in the presence of independent crises and increases when
internationally linked financial crises occur.
9The values of the indices are coincidentally similar at the end of the period, but little
can be read into this given the different numbers of crises experienced.
22
The degree of international financial turmoil in currency crises was shown
to have broadly risen over the 20th century, associated with a rise in the
currency crisis turbulent-periods concordance index. Banking crises were
highly internationalised at the beginning of the sample, and following the
crises of 1931 experienced a relatively crisis free period, associated with the
strict regulatory structures of the post Depression era (through War controls,
the Bretton Woods system). The degree of international financial turmoil in
banking crises fell until late in the 20th century, shown as a fall in the banking
crisis turbulent-periods concordance index. However, in the late 20th century
and first decade of the 21st century, the banking crisis concordance index
has risen again. This reflects the internationalisation of recent banking crisis
episodes, particularly the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. The analysis
suggests support for the view put forward in Brunnermeier et al. (2009) that
while crisis management may be a matter for individual country authorities,
crisis prevention requires international coordination.
23
Acknowledgements
A previous version of the paper circulated under the title ‘Synchronisation of
financial crises’. Drafts of this paper were written during visits of the first two
authors to the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (CERF) and
Queens’ College, University of Cambridge and CenTER, Tilburg University.
We thank these institutions, and particularly John Eatwell and Daan van
Soest, for their hospitality. Dungey acknowledges funding from ARC Grant
DP0343418, Jacobs acknowledges support from the Research School SOM,
University of Groningen. Lestano acknowledges support of the Atma Jaya
Catholic University and thanks the University of Groningen. The present
version of the paper has benefitted from suggestions of Dirk Baur, Jerry
Dwyer, Don Harding, Patrick Honohan, Brian Lucey, Adrian Pagan, Elmer




[1] Agresti, Alan 2002. Categorical data analysis. Wiley Series in Probability
and Statistics. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. NJ.
[2] Anderson, T.W.; and Leo A. Goodman 1957. “Statistical inference about
Markov chains.” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 28(1), 89–110.
[3] Bagehot, Walter 1962 [1873]. Lombard Street. A Description of the
Money Market. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
[4] Beck, Thorsten; Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt; and Ross Levine 2006. “Bank con-
centration, competition, and crises: First results.” Journal of Banking
& Finance, 30, 1581–1603
[5] Berg, Andrew; and Catherine Pattillo 1999. “Are currency crises pre-
dictable? A test.” IMF Staff Papers 46/2, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, D.C
[6] Bordo, Michael D. 2003. “Market discipline and financial crisis policy:
An historical perspective.” Paper prepared for the Contemporary Eco-
nomic Policy Session: Theory, and Evidence. Western Economic Asso-
ciation International Meetings, Denver Colorado, July 2003
[7] Bordo, Michael D.; and Barry Eichengreen 1999. “Is our current inter-
national economic environment unusually crisis prone?” in David Gruen
and Luke Gower, eds., Reserve Bank of Australia 1999 Conference, Cap-
ital Flows and the International Financial System. Sydney: Reserve
Bank of Australia, 18–75.
25
[8] Bordo, Michael D.; Barry Eichengreen; Daniela Klingebiel; and
Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria 2001. “Is the crisis problem growing more
severe?” Economic Policy, 16, 53–82.
[9] Bordo, Michael J.; and Anna J. Schwartz 1996. “Why clashes between
internal and external stability goals end in curreny crises, 1797–1994.”
Open Economies Review, 7, 437–468.
[10] Brunnermeier, M. 2009. “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch:
2007-2008”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23, 77-100.
[11] Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C., Persuad, A. and Shin,
H. 2009. The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation: Geneva
Reports on the World Economy 11, ICMB and CEPR.
[12] Caprio, Gerard; and Daniela Klingebiel 1996. “Bank insolvencies: cross-
country experience.” World Bank, Washington, D.C., Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1620.
[13] Crockett, Andrew 2004. “Progress towards greater international finan-
cial stability,” in David Vines and Christopher L. Gilbert, eds., The IMF
and its Critics: Reform of Global Finanial Architecture. Cambridge UK:
Cambridge University Press, 36–58.
[14] Dungey, Mardi; and Vance L. Martin 2007. “Unravelling financial mar-
ket linkages during crises.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22, 89-119.
[15] Eichengreen, Barry 2003. Capital flows and crises. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
26
[16] Eichengreen, Barry; and Michael D. Bordo 2003. “Crises now and then:
what lessons from the last era of financial globalization?” in Paul Mizen,
ed., Monetary History, Exchange Rates and Financial Markets: Essays
in honour of Charles Goodhart. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 52–91.
[17] Eichengreen, Barry; Andrew K. Rose; and Charles Wyplosz 1995. “Ex-
change rate mayhem: the antecedents and aftermath of speculative at-
tacks.” Economic Policy, 2, 251–312.
[18] Eichengreen, Barry; Andrew K. Rose; and Charles Wyplosz 1996. “Con-
tagious currency crises: first tests.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
98(4), 463–484.
[19] Glick, Reuven and Michael Hutchison 2001. “Banking and currency
crises: how common are twins?” in Reuven Glick, Ramon Moreno, and
Mark M. Spiegel, eds., Financial Crises in Emerging Markets. Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 35–72.
[20] Glick, Reuven; and Andrew K. Rose 1999. “Contagion and trade: why
are currency crises regional?” Journal of International Money and Fi-
nance, 18(4), 603–617.
[21] Goldstein, Morris; Graziela L. Kaminsky; and Carmen M. Reinhart
2000. Assessing financial vulnerability: an early warning system for
emerging markets. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Eco-
nomics.
[22] Goodhart, Charles; and P.J.R. Delargy 1998. “Financial crises: plus c¸a
change, plus c’est la meˆme chose.” International Finance, 1(2), 261–287.
27
[23] Haldane, Andrew G.; and Mark Kruger 2004. “The resolution of in-
ternational financial crises: an alternative framework,” in David Vines
and Christopher L. Gilbert, eds., The IMF and its Critics: Reform
of Global Finanial Architecture. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 207–224.
[24] Harding, Don; and Adrian R. Pagan 2006. “Synchronisation of cycles.”
Journal of Econometrics, 132, 59–79.
[25] Isard, Peter 2005. Globalization and the International Financial System:
What’s Wrong and What Can Be Done, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
[26] Jacobs, Jan P.A.M.; and Lestano 2007. “Dating currency crises with ad
hoc and extreme value based thresholds: East Asia 1970-2002.” Inter-
national Journal of Finance and Economics, 12, 371-388.
[27] Kaminsky, Graziela L.; and Carmen M. Reinhart 1999. “The twin crises:
the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems.” American
Economic Review, 89(3), 473–500.
[28] Kaminsky, Graziela L.; and Carmen M. Reinhart 2003. “The center and
the periphery: tales of financial turmoil.” National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc., NBER Working Papers: No. 9479.
[29] Kedem, Benjamin 1980. Binary Time Series. Volume 52 of Lecture Notes
in Pure and Applied Mathematics. New York and Basel: Marcel Dekker.
28
[30] Kindleberger, Charles P. 1996. Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History
of Financial Crises. London: MacMillan Press.
[31] Pagan, Adrian R. 2005. “Some econometric analysis of constructed bi-
nary series.” Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, The Aus-
tralian National University, Canberra, Australia, CAMA Working Pa-
per: No. #7/2005.
[32] Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. 2009. This Time is Differ-
ent: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton and Oxford: Prince-
ton University Press.
[33] Rose, A. and Spiegel, M. 2009. Cross-Country Causes and Consequences
of the 2008 Crisis: Early Warning, NBER Working Paper 1537.
[34] Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1999. “Must financial crises be this frequent and this
painful?” in Pierre-Richard Age´nor, Marcus Miller, David Vines, and
Axel Weber, eds., The Asian financial crisis: causes, contagion and
consequences. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 386–403.
[35] Van Rijckeghem, C. and Weder, B. 2001.“Sources of Contagion: Is it
Finance or Trade?”, Journal of International Economics, 54, 293-308.
29
Table 1:
Occurrences of financial crises: 1883-2008
Currency Crises Banking Crises Twin Crises
Argentina 20 9 4
Australia 7 2 0
Belgium 5 6 0
Brazil 14 9 3
Canada 10 1 0
Chile 10 5 1
Denmark 8 6 2
Finland 7 5 3
France 9 7 0
Germany 5 4 1
Greece 7 2 1
Italy 8 9 1
Japan 7 4 0
Netherlands 6 4 1
Norway 4 5 1
Portugal 6 6 2
Spain 8 5 1
Sweden 5 5 2
Switzerland 4 3 0
UK 11 3 0
UK 7 11 2
All countries 168 111 25
30
Table 2:
Univariate tests of independence versus first order Markov process: p-values















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Index value Observations Critical Values
Currency crises across countries
At least 2 crises 0.57 39 18
At least 3 crises 0.29 20 7
At least 4 crises 0.14 10 3
At least 5 crises 0.10 7 1
At least 6 crises 0.09 6 1
At least 7 crises 0.06 4 1
At least 8 crises 0.04 3 1
At least 10 crises 0.03 2 1
At least 12 crises 0.03 2 1
At least 14 crises 0.01 1 1
Crises observations (n− nz=0) 69
Banking crises across countries
At least 2 crises 0.59 26 7
At least 3 crises 0.34 5 2
At least 4 crises 0.14 6 1
At least 5 crises 0.09 7 1
At least 6 crises 0.07 3 1
At least 7 crises 0.07 3 1
At least 8 crises 0.05 2 1
At least 10 crises 0.05 2 1
At least 12 crises 0.02 1 1
At least 13 crises 0.02 1 1
Crises observations (n− nz=0) 44
Note: the critical value gives the maximum number of observations for the case at hand
that rejects the null hypothesis of multivariate independence at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 6:
Simultaneity of currency and banking crises
Number of periods Total
with z simultaneous
banking crises
z = 0 z = 1 z ≥ 2
Number of periods z = 0 46 4 7 57
with z simultaneous z = 1 19 5 6 30
currency crises z ≥ 2 17 9 13 39
Total 82 18 26 126
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Figure 3: Turbulent-periods concordance index for two series with equal




























Figure 4: Multivariate turbulent periods concordance index for two or more
simultaneous crises as a function of the number of single crisis periods nz=1
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